Overbilling and Informed Financial Consent -A Contractual Solution
Barak D. Richman, J.D., Ph.D., Mark A. Hall, J.D., and Kevin A. Schulman, M.D. U .S. hospitals and physicians have been known to charge uninsured patients and patients re ceiving care outside their health plan networks an average of 2.5 times what most health insurers pay and more than 3 times their actual costs. 1 Controversy over list prices triggered more than 120 lawsuits in 2004 and 2005, 2 and the debate has found new relevance with increased calls in Congress for pricing transparen cy and the requirement in the Af fordable Care Act (ACA) that nonprofit hospitals publicize their discounting policies for unin sured patients. The theory of im plied contracts, a foundation in most firstyear courses in contract law, offers a useful legal and eth ical mechanism for handling these troubling problems in health care billing.
A staple lawschool hypotheti cal illustrates the usual function of implied contracts: a physician encounters an unconscious strang er in the street who requires im mediate medical attention. The physician promptly gives the stranger the requisite emergency care and later submits a bill for her services. Is she entitled to payment?
According to elementary con tract principles, she is. Had the stranger been conscious and able to negotiate a contract be fore he required medical atten tion, he clearly would have con sented to purchase the medical services. When parties are un able to negotiate -because of insufficient time or the inability to communicate, for examplethe law imputes an "implied con tract," creating a legal obligation that mimics one created by mu tual assent. 3 This legal argument is usually invoked to enforce payment for medical services to which patients cannot expressly consent, but the logic of implied contracts works both ways: just as the law im putes an obligation to pay, it similarly imputes a price -that to which the patient and provider would have agreed. The doctrine thus limits the amount that pro viders can reasonably expect to receive to the prevailing market price. Accordingly, an implied contracts approach informs the way the law should handle accu sations that providers use "list prices" to overcharge patients.
In a profession that places a high premium on informed con sent, there are several reasons why providers do not obtain meaningful "informed financial consent" from patients before en tering into financial agreements. Longstanding professional norms prevent discussion of fees before a physician cares for the sick, and enormous accounting com plexity causes both providers and patients to lack the capacity to negotiate and assent to a bill. But the profession's failure to insist on informed financial consent has both triggered sharp criticism and fueled untamed health care prices, necessitating a better ap proach to assigning prices in con tracts for health care services.
There are at least four mecha nisms that can help solve the problem of excessive listprice billing. The first, which could be labeled a "marketbased approach," is to require greater disclosure of providers' prices. Policy scholars have argued that greater billing transparency would enhance price competition among providers, and calls for more public reporting of average or list charges are gain ing momentum. Although such aggregated reporting does little to help patients understand their financial options at the bedside, it offers the hope that greater transparency will bring list prices down to competitive levels.
A second approach, which ap peals to professionalism, empha sizes that physicians and perhaps hospitals owe fiduciary duties to their patients. Medical ethics has traditionally separated the delivery of care from ordinary market place mores and profitmaximiz ing pricing. Building on this tra dition, professional ethics could require providers to set prices that explicitly consider the interests of their patients as consumers with limited resources. Australia's med ical profession has assumed this fiduciary role. In response to growing concern that providers were charging patients with pri vate insurance 50 to 100% more than those covered only by the government, Australian doctors committed to telling patients in advance (when possible) how much they would pay out of pock et for a chosen course of treat ment. 4 As a result, more than half of privately insured Austra lian patients with planned hos pital admissions in 2007 gave fi nancial consent to prices their providers specified in advance. 5 A third approach is price reg ulation. Section 9007 of the ACA, for example, recognizes that list prices frequently do not reflect market forces and thus requires taxexempt hospitals to collect from lowincome uninsured pa tients "not more than the amounts generally billed to individuals who have insurance." Some state laws use similar mechanisms but with alternative benchmarks. A Cali fornia law, passed in 2006, caps charges for the uninsured on the basis of Medicare rates, and a 2008 Illinois law links such caps to the cost of care. These regula tory approaches are consistent with a more broadly held belief that price regulation is necessary to correct certain market failures in health care, but they offer solu tions only to uninsured patients in nonprofit hospitals and do not address the larger problems of billing for outofnetwork care.
A fourth approach -the sim plest and most preferable one, in our view -follows a logic akin to that of implied contracts. An impliedcontracts approach would obligate a patient to pay whatever amount a prudent patient and provider would have agreed to, given appropriate time and infor mation. The best proxy for in formed bargaining is what simi larly situated consumers and providers actually bargain fornamely, the rates negotiated be tween providers and private in surers. After all, insurers are purchasers that possess sufficient information and options to nego tiate market rates. Another use ful proxy might be Medicare re imbursement rates, because those rates -offered by the govern ment and accepted by providers, who are permitted to refusealso approximate the lower end of the range of prices that a rea sonably informed negotiation would produce.
An impliedcontracts approach prevents overbilling of both un insured patients and patients who receive care outside negotiated networks. It also offers a method for defining widespread and inten tionally ambiguous price terms found in the fine print of con tracts that litter the health care marketplace, such as "usual" or "customary" prices. The law fre quently fills in the gaps in am biguous or incomplete contracts, not only when negotiations are impossible (as when an uncon scious patient requires emergency care) but also when parties, for whatever reason, fail to produce fully specified contracts.
It is U.S. medicine's discom fort with discussing pricesand, it must be said, the finan cial advantages of doing business this way -that makes so many medical contracts incomplete. Yet the law permits only what simi larly situated parties would have agreed to if negotiations had been complete, not what provid ers say is their individual custom. Contractual incompleteness gives neither providers nor patients a general license to fill in the con tractual gaps however they like after medical services are provid ed; instead, it enforces the con tract that both parties would have created themselves if time and capacity had permitted.
It is time to revisit some of the billing practices that have brought us to a state of finan cial crisis in health care, and the decoupling of the relationship be tween price and service is among the health care market's biggest problems. Establishing informed financial consent as an essential element of medical practice would both fulfill the profession's ethi cal commitment to patient auton omy and provide a muchneeded marketbased counterforce to price escalation. But until that happens, the doctrine of implied contracts can and should be used to curtail some of the most abusive billing practices.
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